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SPAIN 
Nominal GDP (1990, 
billions pesetas) 54250.0 
Population (millions, 
mid 1989) 
Exports (1989, billions 
39.0 
pesetas) 9454.4 
Imports (1989, billions 
pesetas) 11 172.5 
Dollar Exchange Rate 
(end March 1990) 108.76 
Forecasts are Averages 
The outlook of the Spanish economy in the first quarter of 1993. 
The SpailÍsh economy has experienced~a quick integration into the 
European framework since the entrance into the EC in 1986. Thus, 
the percentage of total Spanish exports bound to Europe increased 
from 49.7% in 1980-1985 to 71.2% in 1992, and the percentage of 
total Spanish imports coming from Europe increased from 33% to 
60.7%. This mean s that an analysis of the Spanish economy should be 
done by connecting it with the evolution experienced by the other 
European partners. 
The economic recession in Europe, in which the Spanish economy 
is deeply immersed, is general and profound, and the domestic 
measures that could be implemented to favour a recovery have to be 
carried within the context of the Maastricht agreement. This implies 
that the EC countries have different degrees of freedom and face very 
different difficulties when trying to design Jhose measures, and both 
things are evaluated permanently in the financial markets. In this 
context it can still be said that the possibilities of a recovery for the 
Spanish economy are firm and probábly stronger than in previous 
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crises, but with fewer degrees of flexibility in the design of the 
economic policy that could give rise to it. 
The entrance of Spain in the European Monetary System with an 
overvalued currency and the libernlization of the capital markets has 
led to a situation in which both the nominal interest rates (Figure 1) 
and the real interest rates are high, aggravating the recession and 
limiting the possibilities of recovery. 
The crisis affecting the Spanish economy can be evaluated through 
the indices of industrial production shown in Figure 2. The index for 
capital goods moved from a 15% rate of growth, early in 1988, to a 
negative 12% change in the first months of 1991. The events that took 
place In Spain in 1992 gave an impulse to investment, and this index 
showed moderate rates of growth during a few months, but this was 
temporary, and a situation with negative percentage changes has built 
up during the last months. . 
The industrial production index for consumer goods, which in the 
first years of this crisis had maintained positive rates of growth, began 
to register negative percentage changes, between 5 and 6%, at the end 
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of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, with expectations that less 
negative values will persist in the near future. In view of all that, it is 
possible that the slowdown in the rate of change in Spanish industrial 
prQduction could ha ve reached its Iowest in the first months of 1993, 
but the projections for the immediate future are not yet optimistic. 
Unfortunately, ihe crisis has reached aIl economic sectors as is 
refIected in the corresponding employment figures. Thus in Figure 3 it 
can be seen that the reduction in employment has al so taken place in 
the service sector, which is something that had not happened since 
1984, and continues in tl1e construction sector at rates of between 5 
and 7%. In accordance with this, unemployment in the non-agriculture 
sectors was 3.1 million at the beginning of 1993 and it could reach 3.6 
million at the end of the year, which would represent 24% of the 
non-agriculture working population. 
The employment figures point out that faIls in production in Spain 
have bigger implications for employmentthan in other countries. 
Consequently, the possible measures to favour a recovery must take 
into account the urgency of stopping the employment destruction 
which is in operation since 1991. This would require agreements to 
promote employment in which the nominal wage increases would not 
be necessarily indexed with inflation but closely connected with 
improvements in productivity. 
In the foreign sector, the nominal exports of goods have been 
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" progressive1y increasing over 1992, especially afterthetwo 
deva1uations which took place in the Autumn of 1992; while imports 
were slowing down, reaching negative percentage changes around 
5%. After the latest devaluation in May 1993, which brought a 21 % 
depreciation to the Spanish currency from its value in the summer 
1992, the trade gap improved more rapidly. 
The previous analysis of the domestic and foreign demands of the 
Spanish economy allows to forecast the main macroeconomic 
aggregates; as shown in Table 1. The Instituto National de-Estadistica 
(INE) - Spanish Central Statistical Office - has recently published 
quarterly national accounts form 1970 (1) to 1992 (IV). The quar!erly 
values have been obtained by interpolating the annual ones using the 
information of the most relevant monthly and quarterly Spanish 
economic indicators. Tablel contains the forecasted annual -
percentage changes of GDP and its main components for the d-ifferent 
quarters of 1993. This table shows that for the average of 1993 -
Spanish GDP will register a decline of 0.8%, which corresponds to a 
2.7% decline in domestic demand anda positivecontribution of the 
foreign sector, due to the improvement in the real exchange rates 
obtained in 1992 and in the first months of 1993, which is expected to 
be maintained in the near future. 
As it isinferred from the previous discussion, foreign demand must 
be the base upon which a recovery policy for the Spanish economy 
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should be constructed. This policy should also ensure that inflation 
will be kept under control in ordeLto get sustained rates of growth. 
Referring to the performance of prices, the prospects are reasonably 
good. Thus the inflation measured through the trend of the consumer 
priceindex (CPI) - underlying inflation - has decreased from 
values over 7% in 1989 to values near 4% in 1992, (Figure 4). On the, 
other hand, due to the fall in domestic demand, the three devaluations 
that have ocurred in the last months have not put too much pressure 
on prices, and for the average of 1993 a reasonable forecast for the 
rate of growth of the CPI is 4.9%. In spite of the gains on inflation 
that were obtained in 1992 ex-ante real interest rates (Figure 5) 
increased during this year, reaching values over 9% at the end of it. In 
the first months of 1993 these real interest rates are stiU too high. It 
. seems then, that the situation requires policy measures which induce a 
reduction in nominal interest rates and, at lhe same time, propriate that 
the greater part of such reduction could be passed on to real interest 
rates. 
It can be contended that this is only possible in a social framework 
in which aH agents understand the seriousness of the crisis and the 
difficulty in overcoming it, even when other countries are entering 
into a period of recovery, and also appreciating that the Spanish 
econoIIly has big possibilities to surmount the crisis, if appropriate 
agreements are reacht?d. These possibilities are based on the 
accumulation of human and physical capital that has taken place in 
Spain during the last 8 or 10 years and on the fact that the new levels 
of competitiveness obtained with the last devaluations could be 
maintained. 
In this context, the first policy measúres should be orientated to 
formulate a budget exhibiting a substantial reduction of the public 
deficit, that has been fluctuating around 4 or 4.5% of GDP in the last 
three years. The effort in the budget mustbe concentrated in 
controHing expenditures and implementing measures directed toward 
reforms of the Spanish public administration so as to get substantial 
gains in the efficiency of expenditures. At the same time sorne 
consensus would be required in order to ensure that the increases in 
wages will be mainly connected with the improvements in 
productivity. These two things could give sufficient degrees of 
freedom to monetary policy in order to reduce nominal interest rates 
which could result in lower real interest rates that could finance the 
recovery without altering the rate of exchange of the peseta. If these 
types of measures are jointly taken the forecast for 1993 could be 
better than that included in Table one, and the Spanish GDP in 1994 
could experience a moderate rate of growth. 
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Table 1. Components of real GDP, % change 
1992 1993 1992 1993 
111 IV 11 111 IV 
Private Consumption 0.2 -0.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6 2.4 -2.1 
Public Consumption 0.2 -0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0 -0.2 4.0 0.9 
Fixed Investment -1.9 -2.0 -1.7 -1.4 -1.1 -0.8 -3.0 -6.2-
Changes in Stocks 2.7 -28.7 -5.5 5.0 4.8 9.1 6.7 -16.8 
Domestic Demand -0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 1.4 -2.7 
Exports 0.5 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 6.4 5.8 
Imports 0.1 -1.0 -1.7 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 6.8 -3.1 
Gross Domestic 
Products -0.2 ~0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 1.0 -0.8 
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FIXED INVESTMENT 
aUARTERLY RATES 
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